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FOREWORD
In this detailed but concise monograph, air power
expert Tami Davis Biddle walks us through our century-long experience of air power as an instrument
of warfare. Using the twin pillars of theory and history, she explains the expectations that were held for
aircraft in war and then examines how those expectations played out in the actual realm of practice. This
monograph, which focuses primarily on the most controversial aspect of air power, coercive bombing, takes
a chronological approach that starts with World War I
and comes all the way to the present day. By contrasting theory and practice, she identifies the overarching
themes that have run through history and pinpoints
those moments when the gaps between theory and
practice have been largest. Her narrative mainly (but
not exclusively) follows the experience of the U.S. Air
Force. By the middle of World War II, the predecessor institution, the U.S. Army Air Forces, was investing more in aircraft than any other nation. The United
States continued that pattern after the war, maintaining a large standing Air Force designed to deter threats
to American interests, and to take a leading role in
fighting the nation’s wars.
Each decade brought new capabilities and new
expectations. Americans embraced aviation technology
and were at the forefront of its rapid development as
an instrument of military power. Not infrequently, air
power proponents expected more from it than it could
deliver on its own. Not every war that the Americans
fought after 1945 was suited to the dominant ways and
means of American air power. The ability to coerce
an enemy rests heavily on an accurate calculation of
enemy will, and determination to sacrifice in order to
hold or gain a stake. The tendency of Americans to
vii

assume that they could successfully coerce—through
numbers and power—has not always served them
well. Biddle explains, however, those times when coercive air power has been effective in the last century
and details the conditions undergirding that effectiveness. Moreover, she argues that early air theorist
Giulio Douhet was right in one particular respect: the
nation that wins and holds “command of the air” has
an immense advantage in conventional warfighting.
Biddle agrees with air theorist Robert Pape’s argument
that gaining air superiority is a sui generis function,
distinct from the application of coercive air power, but
that such superiority facilitates the subsequent use of
coercive air power, and forms a crucial foundation for
its success.
In trying to discern where expectations and outcomes were misaligned, and why, she hopes to help
sharpen the critical thinking skills of strategists. She
explains that successful coercion relies on highly
detailed knowledge of the actor or actors one seeks to
coerce. If those seeking to use aerial bombing for coercion use intelligence that lacks insight and nuance—
or relies on mirror-imaging—then they will often find
themselves facing bigger or thornier challenges than
they expected. They will find, as well, that civilian
populations are often more robust and resilient than
air power theorists—and air forces generally—expect
them to be, and that local coercive mechanisms can
overwhelm more remote ones. Experience from the
past tells us that war economies are usually less fragile and more adaptable than anticipated, and that, for
a variety of reasons, air forces are rarely at liberty to
carry out a bombing campaign in the way that they
would prefer.
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Biddle explains that gaining and holding air superiority over a battlespace became so much a part of
the American style of warfighting that the U.S. military tended to assume it was a permanent fixture of
the American way of war. However, this assumption,
unfortunately, is no longer sound. Highly accurate
and relatively inexpensive defensive systems have
changed the game rather dramatically in recent years.
The United States cannot be certain of air superiority
in a wide range of scenarios now, even when facing
adversaries that are not considered near-peer competitors. Addressing this situation and finding ways
to maintain dominance in the air power realm will be
high priority tasks for the U.S. Air Force in the years to
come. In addition, its ability to make headway on this
front will impact U.S. military effectiveness across the
board.
Looking forward to the next 25-30 years, Biddle
argues that air power—the way we think about it and
what we expect of it—will go through a period of flux
as the technology of the information age begins to take
full effect. In some scenarios, our current knowledge
and our legacy systems will retain their full utility; in
others, they will retain only partial utility. As we move
forward to environments increasingly characterized by
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), we will be forced to
rethink many of our most fundamental assumptions,
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and to develop new methods and platforms designed
to deter potential adversaries, to protect our interests,
and to prevail in the event of war.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In this monograph, Tami Davis Biddle analyzes the
historical record of air power over the past 100 years.
Her survey, designed for the student of strategy, is
intended to provide both a concise introduction to the
topic and a framework for thinking intelligently about
air power, particularly aerial bombing. Her primary
aim is to discern the distinction between what has been
expected of air power by theorists and military institutions, and what it has produced in the crucible of war.
Throughout this monograph, Biddle encourages students to focus primarily on the assumptions underpinning theories about what aerial bombing, in particular,
might achieve, and why. Such assumptions are powerfully influenced by attitudes, ideas, capabilities, and
fears prevailing at the moment when a given theory is
articulated.
After their arrival on the scene in the early years
of the 20th century, airplanes posed institutional challenges to all military organizations seeking to employ
them. Immediate questions arose: How should they
be used? Who should control them? How will they
interact with other military instruments? None of the
questions had simple or straightforward answers,
and every military institution had to work out solutions tailored to its own needs. Early in World War I, it
became obvious that airplanes were powerful military
instruments offering important advantages to those
who employed them well, and acute disadvantages to
those who failed to do so. They immediately proved
their worth in a wide range of activities, including
reconnaissance, surveillance, communication, artillery
spotting, ground attack, and short- and long-range
bombardment. The value of airspace was immediately
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evident, prompting the creation of “fighter” airplanes
designed to protect one’s airspace and deny it to one’s
enemies.
Aerial bombing was the most dramatic new innovation made possible by heavier-than-air flight, and
the one bearing the highest burden of expectation. Both
short- and long-range bombing received preliminary
and inconclusive trials during World War I, and this
fueled ongoing speculation and debate throughout the
interwar years. World War II provided an extensive
test of air power, and aerial bombing especially, but
it did not resolve ongoing debates about the ability of
bombers to win wars independently, as some claimed
they might do.
Aerial bombing, Biddle argues, cannot control
the ground. It is fundamentally a coercive activity in
which an attacker seeks to structure the enemy’s incentives—using threats and actions to shape and constrain
the enemy’s options, both perceived and real. It is an
important and much-utilized military instrument for
both deterrence and compellence. However, its ability to produce results varies, and students of strategy
must understand the circumstances under which it is
more or less likely to achieve particular results or political ends.
Biddle points to the assumptions embedded in theories of aerial bombing articulated before and during
World War II, and assesses whether these assumptions eventually aligned with actual wartime experience. Relying principally on the extensive experience
of the postwar U.S. Air Force, she undertakes similar
analyses with respect to the many bombing campaigns
that organization waged from the 1950s through to
the present day. She explains and assesses the work
of some of the more prominent air power theorists of
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the recent past, including John Boyd and John Warden.
In trying to discern where expectations and outcomes
were misaligned, and why, she hopes to help sharpen
the critical thinking skills of strategists.
She explains that successful coercion relies on
highly detailed and nuanced knowledge of the actor or
actors one seeks to coerce. Because of this, those seeking to use aerial bombing for coercion will often find
themselves facing bigger or thornier challenges than
they expected. They will find, as well, that: civilian
populations are often more robust and resilient than
air power theorists—and air forces generally—expect
them to be; that local coercive mechanisms can overwhelm more remote ones; that war economies are usually less fragile and more adaptable than anticipated;
and that, for a variety of reasons, air forces are rarely
at liberty to carry out a bombing campaign in the way
that they would prefer.
Looking forward to the next 25-30 years, Biddle
argues that air power—the way we think about it and
what we expect of it—will go through a period of flux,
as the technology of the information age begins to take
full effect. In some scenarios, our current knowledge
and our legacy systems will retain their full utility; in
others, they will retain only partial utility. Moreover,
as we move forward to environments increasingly
characterized by anti-access/area denial (A2/AD),
we will be forced to rethink many of our most fundamental assumptions, and to develop new methods and
platforms designed to deter potential adversaries, protect our interests, and to prevail in the event of war.
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AIR POWER AND WARFARE: A CENTURY OF
THEORY AND HISTORY
When political actors want to achieve aims and
protect interests in the international system, they typically turn to diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic tools. Among military planners, this set of
tools is typically referred to as the “DIME.” Within
each subcategory, there are theories for how to maximize the utility of each instrument. As we evaluate
any military subcategory, we must ask ourselves:
What leverage does it offer those who employ it? What
are its primary strengths and limitations? How does
it interact with other instruments of power (both military and non-military)? Can it be used independently?
What are the advantages and risks of doing so?
Military instruments typically stand in the background, reinforcing other tools and being called into
play if those tools fail to achieve desired results. Landpower, sea power, and air power—with the recent
addition of space and cyber power—all bring different types of leverage to the table. The strategist must
understand them all, and must understand how they
interoperate. The purpose of this monograph is to
identify and analyze theories for the employment of
air power. The focus here is principally—albeit not
exclusively—on the experience of the United States.
Since World War I, the United States has relied on aircraft extensively for purposes of both deterrence and
warfighting. This national experience is wide-ranging
and varied, and thus offers a good opportunity to test
theory against reality.
If one is to understand air power—or any instrument of power—one must understand the assumptions that underpin the mechanism linking its use to
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the achievement of a particular political end or goal.
A theory is a basic hypothesis about causation: if we
use X (air power), then we achieve Y (desired political aim). This formulation forces us to focus on the
assumptions inherent in the linkage between X and
Y. If, for instance, we make a claim about the utility
of aerial bombing, we must understand what is at
the heart of that claim—what is the mechanism linking the instrument of power to the achievement of a
desired outcome? To argue—as U.S. planners did in
World War II—that attacking ball bearing factories
in Germany will undermine the German war effort,
one must first be able to answer several fundamental
questions, including: Are ball bearings central to the
Germany war effort? Are they a scarce commodity,
one not easily replaced? Then, just as importantly, one
must ask: Is it tactically and operationally possible to
attack ball bearing production and storage sites?
How aircraft might help achieve political aims,
and who ought to employ aircraft for such purposes,
developed into one of the most contentious and sustained military debates of the 20th century. Echoes
of the struggle exist still, especially in budget battles
within nations. At this point, we have more than 100
years of experience with air power as a military instrument, and this historical record has given us a strong
sense of where theories have either aligned with or
departed from expectations. The analysis is of particular significance at this moment in time, as changes
in technology force us to rethink what we know and
understand about the use of air power. Our existing
knowledge (and legacy systems) will retain full utility in some scenarios and partial utility in others. By
2030, we are likely to see the beginnings of dramatic
change. After that date, even our most fundamental
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imperatives, like the need for air superiority in a
battlespace, will require new thinking, new methods,
and new means of execution as we face the spread of
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments. In the
coming decades, aerial platforms are likely to become
smaller, and manned aircraft are likely to be relied
upon less and less frequently. If we can understand
our past experience with nuance and skill, we will
enter the future with a clearer perspective and more
confidence.
SOME KEY THEMES
Strategist Colin Gray has specified that range and
reach, speed of passage (unrivaled except by ballistic
missiles and spacecraft), freedom of choice in movement, and flexibility of concentration are the advantages of air power. While the movement of aircraft can
be inhibited politically by rights to airspace, aircraft
have fewer limitations on movement than armies and
navies. Still, Gray observes, “the all-vector menace
posed by an enemy in the air is somewhat alleviated
by the fact that whatever his choices of routes, he has
to arrive over or close to targets whose value is wellknown.”1 Among the limitations of air power, Gray
lists: gravity, expense, impact of weather, brevity of
presence, and the inability to come to sustained grip
with an enemy. Recently, remotely piloted aircraft
(RPA)—also known as drones—have alleviated some
of the problems associated with brevity of presence. In
addition, ever-improving all-weather capabilities have
enabled aircraft to fly in conditions that previously
would have been prohibitive.2 Speed, however, may
in the future become less of an asset than it is now.
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When implemented well, air power offers enormous advantages. Lord Tedder, who had commanded
Allied air forces in World War II prior to the Normandy landing, explained:
in order even to begin to wage war successfully, it is
necessary to arrive at the situation in which the enemy air
opposition is unable to interfere effectively with our own
operations—that is what we mean by air superiority.3

Owning air superiority meant, for instance, that Allied
troops could land successfully on D-day in 1944; it
meant that South Korean and U.S. forces driven into
the Pusan perimeter in 1950 would not be pushed into
the sea. It meant that the United States and its allies
could operate in the Gulf war (1991) and the Iraq war
(2003) without much concern about the Iraqi Air Force.
Holding on to control of its airspace in 1940 meant
that Britain could continue to fight Germany in World
War II, and the United States could station assets there
once it joined the war.
Air superiority is necessary because airspace is
valuable. From the moment airplanes made their first
appearance, they proved to be potent military instruments. Right away, they enabled a view directly over
and behind enemy lines. This allowed for the tracking of enemy movement, and the targeting of enemy
assets. In modern expressions of this role, new air- and
space-based platforms gather detailed intelligence and
provide ongoing surveillance of enemy systems and
behavior. Related to this, aircraft contribute to the communications realm; they have performed in this role
using everything from early wireless sets to sophisticated radios, and from the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) to Link 16. Air- and space-based
mechanisms are heavily relied on to provide timely,
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vital intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) to commanders.
Aircraft have been and will remain powerful tools
in the joint fight. They bring crucially important assets
to the table for the joint commander: the means for
achieving air superiority, reconnaissance, communication, battlefield air attack, and interdiction. Air
power supports naval power in winning and holding command of the sea, and helps crucially in protecting a nation’s borders, coastlines, and airways. Air
power can assist land and naval forces in denying an
adversary’s ability to successfully achieve its aims in
battle.4 (For instance, part of the role of contemporary
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] forces
is to threaten to deny Russia successful invasion of
NATO-member states—and air forces have a key mission in this.) To contend with an enemy possessing
air assets, one must have air assets too, including air
defenses (over the battlefield and the homeland). An
army without air power is desperately vulnerable on
its “overhead flank” if it is fighting an enemy that possesses air power. Air lift and air mobility are crucial
assets for any commander. Aircraft are essential tools
in providing humanitarian aid in disaster zones, and
in search and rescue missions of all types.
From the earliest days of aviation, airplanes also
have engaged in the direct destruction of enemy assets
and interdiction of enemy materiel at both short and
long ranges. “Strategic bombing” is an umbrella term
referring to the bombing of enemy assets far from the
line of battle, usually on the enemy home front (industries, infrastructure, centers of communication, and
the general population). Throughout its history, the
utility of this form of air power has been hotly contested. Such bombing can take place as part of a larger
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campaign (for example, the Anglo-American combined bomber offensive in Europe or the Gulf war
air campaign), or it can be utilized on its own (as in
NATO’s 1999 war in the Balkans or limited, highly
specific strikes on enemy assets). In recent years,
modern air theorists have sought to impose forms of
paralysis on an enemy; they focus less on destruction
than on degrading normal processes of communicating and functioning.
The earliest advocates of long-range bombing
expected that it would have a physical impact as well
as a moral or psychological impact. However, air theorists have varied in their assumptions about what creates the linkage between bombing (as a threat or an act)
and the attainment of a political aim. In his important
book Arms and Influence, Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling delineated two ways of using
violence to achieve desired ends. If using brute force,
an attacker imposes his will on an enemy without the
need for cooperation. When a state lands an army on
foreign shores, defeats the enemy military’s services,
and occupies the land, it is using brute force. There
is no need for cooperation by the opponent. By contrast, coercion involves manipulating the behavior of
an adversary by structuring its incentives (manipulating costs and benefits through threats and action). It
requires cooperation from an opponent.5
Air and naval instruments of power are principally
coercive, and thus require a particularly sophisticated
understanding of the adversary, including their will,
weak points, and resilience. Some air theorists have
focused on threatening/imposing punishment on
an enemy in order to achieve political aims; others
have focused on destroying specific resources central
to an enemy’s war effort. Punishment, as a coercive
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strategy, relies on the threat of (or imposition of) pain
and loss, and the creation of social upheaval. These, in
turn, create effects that push an actor to sue for terms
or concede a stake. When it comes to strategies that
threaten punishment, nuclear weapons are the ne plus
ultra in this realm: no weapon has ever been able to
threaten punishment like nuclear weapons can.6
Building on Schelling’s work in his influential book
Bombing to Win (1996), Robert Pape introduced four
categories of coercive air strategies: punishment; risk
(holding back on striking some valuable targets while
making clear one may do so if there is no negotiation
or concession); denial (weakening or smashing an enemy’s military forces so that his security is degraded);
and decapitation (striking an enemy’s key leadership
and telecommunications assets).7 Pape imposed his
theoretical taxonomy after the fact, and his categorization is by no means used or accepted by all those
who write about air power. Few air power theorists
have been sufficiently specific and articulate about
how they link action and outcome, and thus historians
are keen to avoid oversimplification or mischaracterization. However, the taxonomy Pape created is useful
for the strategist: it highlights important assumptions
embedded in theories of aerial bombing and offers a
practical starting point for discussion and analysis.
Pape also argued that gaining and holding air
superiority is not a separate (fifth) category of coercive
air strategy. Instead, he insisted that air superiority is
a prerequisite to the implementation of all of the other
coercive air strategies, because “aircraft cannot systematically place bombs on any target set if air operations encounter strong opposition from enemy forces.”
And, in a comment that parallels Sir Julian Corbett’s
thinking on sea power, he added, “Air superiority
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need not extend over the enemy’s entire territory, but
only over the target set the attacker intends to strike
and the air corridors to it.”8
Ever-improving technologies have supported
increasingly sophisticated forms of precision strike.
Bombing capability has advanced with evolving
methods for target acquisition, penetration of enemy
airspace, and self-protection. Twenty-first century
bombers are light years ahead of their primitive World
War I ancestors. Missiles and modern RPAs support
highly precise strike options without placing a pilot
in harm’s way. Many forms of naval power, most
especially cruise missiles, can be—and will be—used
in coercive air campaigns from stand-off distances.
However, naval and marine air assets will usually be
employed in direct support of sea-oriented operations
or ground and/or amphibious operations—and will
be vital to their success. In the future, though, airspace
will be guarded by increasingly sophisticated and precise defense platforms and networks, and this fact will
pose challenges to even the most advanced offensive
aerial platforms.
THE EARLY YEARS
For centuries before the Wright brothers’ first flight
in 1903, humans had tried to imagine all of the future
roles that airplanes might play—as both military and
non-military instruments. During World War I, aircraft underwent revolutionary, telescoped changes
driven by the intensely competitive demands of the
war. In 1914, warplanes were primitive machines held
together by wire and twine; by 1918, large, sophisticated four-engine bombers had been developed and
used. These new instruments had major institutional
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and organizational ramifications for all modern military services—and the institutional transformation
this entailed was far from painless. Prewar expectations tended to influence the interpretation of wartime
experience. Since the interpretation of data and evidence is heavily conditioned by what people expect
to see, observations are colored by social, cultural, and
political influences. Prior to the outbreak of World
War I, civilian writers typically held higher expectations for air warfare than military planners did. The
latter were generally conservative, expecting an airplane’s main or sole contribution to be reconnaissance.
However, a minority—officers who came to hold formative roles in the development of air power and thus
came to hold an institutional stake in the future of air
warfare—emerged from the war with strong convictions and bold claims about the revolutionary impact
of the airplane in war.
During World War I, airplanes proved their worth
in a variety of realms. Indeed, nearly every modern
mission of aircraft received at least a rudimentary
trial between 1914 and 1918. As many had expected,
airplanes proved to be extraordinary reconnaissance
tools, revolutionizing the way that intelligence was
gathered, and how the battlespace was monitored and
utilized. Indeed, the obvious value of airspace created
an instant need for instruments that could both seek it
out (over enemy territory) and preserve it (over one’s
own territory). This led directly to the rise of fighter
aircraft—and to their rapid development during the
war. They have remained crucially important aerial
assets ever since, with fighters and fighter tactics
becoming increasingly sophisticated.
The relatively primitive state of communications
technology in 1914 meant that air-to-ground and
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air-to-air contact was limited, but it improved generally over the course of the war. Such communication
increasingly allowed for artillery spotting and targeting. Battlefield air attack was a difficult and risky
operation in World War I, but when done successfully,
it brought impressive results. Tactics for the employment of aircraft over the battlefield were worked out
in the same way that the tactics for modern combined
arms were worked out between 1914 and 1918—
through intensive trial and error. By the end of the
war, a body of doctrine existed for all modern uses of
aircraft.9
The World War I record of long-range (“strategic”)
bombardment was mixed. The hardware and tools
needed to make it a viable proposition—including
engines, airframes, navigation methods, and bomb
development—were primitive at the outset of the
war. By 1917, the Germans had twin- and four-engine
bombers capable of waging attacks on Britain, but
these were limited in number. By that time the British were developing a large bomber to be used over
Berlin in 1919, but the war ended before it could be
brought into service. The Italians also developed a
large bomber during the course of the war.10
Not only was it difficult for the attacking bombers
to reach their targets with their primitive navigation
methods, but it was also difficult for them to bomb
accurately. Moreover, limited numbers of planes put a
ceiling on the damage that could be achieved through
air attacks. However, by 1917 to 1918, several military institutions had theories and plans for long-range
bombing. Some theoretically inclined planners in the
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and newly indepen
dent Royal Air Force (RAF), for instance, argued for
sustained attacks on key targets in the German war
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economy, including munitions, chemicals, and the
steel industry. American observers were impressed
by this focus on potential bottlenecks in the enemy
war economy; indeed, they incorporated these ideas
into their first plan for strategic bombing, compiled
in 1917 but never implemented.11 These ideas would
take hold and develop in the 1930s as the “industrial
fabric” theory (or “industrial web” theory) at the U.S.
Air Corps Tactical School.
The impact that World War I’s bombing had on an
enemy’s civilian morale was difficult to interpret, and
observers tended to draw from it what they expected
to see. Because long-range attacks were neither heavy
nor sustained, they did not compel civilians to pressure their governments to sue for peace. What they did
do, however—especially in the case of Britain—was to
embolden civilians to demand better air defenses, and
to call for retaliation against attackers. Nervous about
civilian morale under air attack, many British elites
assumed that these public demands were fueled by
panic and terror. However, a close look at the primary
sources indicates, instead, that the British public was
indignant, not terrorized. Much prewar writing, influenced by racist and social Darwinist theories, anticipated that urban laborers, women, and Jews would be
particularly vulnerable. This proved not to be the case,
although many British elites who had been steeped
in these ideas continued to look at events through
narrow lenses influenced by social attitudes.12
For their part, the Germans were disappointed
with the impact of long-range bombing. While they
knew their effort had been limited in resources and
scale, they realized, too, that they had not been able
to seriously undermine the British war economy or
reduce the British will to fight. However, the very fact
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that long-range bombing had been a marginal effort
compared to the vast ground war meant that the
wartime experience was not the end of the story but
rather the beginning. During the interwar years, those
making bold claims for air power gained degrees of
legitimacy for a variety of reasons. The war had indicated that technological advancement could take place
in a highly telescoped way. Many observers thus
concluded that the technological development of air
power would be fast and relentless—and offensive
capabilities would outstrip defensive ones. Moreover,
many assumed that some of the most daunting weapons of the war, including chemicals and gas, would be
teamed with air power.13
Air advocates argued that all modern states would
have to embrace airplanes as essential tools of war
and deterrence, insisting that those who failed to do
so would put themselves at an enormous disadvantage in the ongoing competition among nations. Air
power—long-range
bombing
especially—would
restore offensive operations to the battlefield, and
would offer the prospect of directly undermining the
enemy’s all-important “will to fight” by strikes on his
homeland. One would be able to leap over the army
and navy and go right to both resources and popular
will. It is interesting to note here that offensive operations had not in fact disappeared from the battlefield.
By 1917, armies had begun to work out the basics of
modern combined arms, restoring the offensive on
land. This was manifest in the German offensive of
March 1918, and in the subsequent ground offensives led by the Americans in 1918. However, many
writers, traumatized by the trench stalemate of 19141917, assumed that the offensive on land was largely
dead. Another common misapprehension of interwar
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theorists was that the German Army and Navy had
not been defeated; instead, its population had lost the
war due to war-weariness and defeatism.
GIULIO DOUHET
Perhaps the most outspoken and assertive initial
advocate for air power was the Italian, Giulio Douhet.
Born into a military family, Douhet first became an
artillery officer. Prior to the start of World War I, he
commanded the Italian Army’s aviation section.
During the war, he recommended breaking the land
war stalemate with Austria by using a 500-plane
bomber force. Because his proposal also contained
a sharp critique of Italian military leaders, he was
court-martialed, but he was recalled to service in 1918
to head the Italian Central Aeronautical Bureau.14 His
1921 book, The Command of the Air, painted a graphic
vision of societal collapse in the face of air attack.
Indeed, it was the futurist drama he conveyed, rather
than the analytical rigor of his ideas that gave Douhet
a lasting place in the canon of air warfare.15 A poet,
painter, playwright, and amateur novelist, Douhet
brought to bear on his work “the intense modernist
fascination with the latest advances in science and
technology . . . prevalent in prewar Italian protofascist
avant-garde culture.”16
Both British and American airmen had developed
indigenous theories of air warfare before Douhet published, but The Command of the Air was cited widely—
especially in the 1930s after it had been widely
translated—and used to support apocalyptic visions
of air warfare. Douhet’s vision stressed the offensive;
indeed, he referred to aircraft as the offensive weapon
par excellence: “Nothing man can do on the surface of
the earth can interfere with a plane in flight. . . . All
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the influences which have conditioned and characterized warfare from the beginning are powerless to
affect aerial action.” He stressed that “the battlefield
will be limited only by the boundaries of the nation,
and all of their citizens will become combatants since
all of them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of
the enemy.”17
Douhet also largely dismissed the potential of
ground defenses. As Phillip Meilinger has noted,
“Douhet sarcastically concluded that ground fire
might down some aircraft, much like muskets shot in
the air might occasionally hit a swallow, but it was not
a serious deterrent to air attack.”18 Once an air force
had fought for and won command of the air, it would
be free to exploit the situation “with forces capable of
defeating the material and moral resistance of the enemy.”19 Such bombing forces, he believed, would be so
effective as to force an enemy government to sue for
terms.
Much of the power of Douhet’s vision came from
his linkage of airplanes and chemical warfare. During
World War I, gas weapons had evoked a sense of
dread in the public mind. Douhet asked, “How could
a country go on living and working under this constant threat, oppressed by the nightmare of imminent
destruction and death?” He was impressed by the possibilities of attack against those of “least moral resistance,” such as factory workers.20 His vision was one
of technological determinism:
The brutal but inescapable conclusion we must draw is
this: in the face of the technical developments of aviation
today, in case of war the strongest army we can deploy . . .
and the strongest navy we can dispose . . . will provide no
effective defense against determined efforts . . . to bomb
our cities.21
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The one virtue of this bombing, he explained, was that
at least wars would now be shorter: civilians would
not endure for long the privations imposed on them
by air.
Douhet was not systematic or analytical about targeting, but he cast a wide net that included industry,
transport, infrastructure, communication, and seats
of government. He believed that a violent offensive
waged relentlessly against a range of important targets, using explosive, incendiary, and gas bombs,
would do the most to destroy the enemy’s will.22 His
writing put great emphasis on coercion by punishment. However, Douhet’s perspective was narrow; he
saw only the evidence that supported his view. As historian Michael Sherry has pointed out, his ideas rested
on crude extrapolation, and, like many other interwar
prophets of air power, he failed to see how it “might
evolve unpredictably, strengthening the defense as
well as the offense, creating its own futile charges and
bloody stalemates.”23
SIR HUGH TRENCHARD
Hugh Montague Trenchard served as a field commander for the British Army’s Royal Flying Corps
during World War I. He would ultimately become
known as the “Father of the RAF,” although this was
ironic, since he initially opposed the creation of a separate air service in Britain. RAF independence, finalized in 1918, resulted largely from public demands
for better air defense, and for retaliation following
German air attacks on Britain. Trenchard was called
on to be the first head of a British long-range bombardment force in 1918; however, he received few airplanes and had little ability to implement any kind of
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systematic bombardment of Germany. It was clear to
him, though, that the British Government and public
expected to see results; he thus felt a need to justify
the use of resources given to him, even if meager. He
argued expediently both during and after the war that
the psychological effect of bombardment was much
greater than the physical effect.24
Named post-World War I Chief of the RAF, Trenchard became a convert to and defender of an independent air force. After the war, the British Army
and the Royal Navy sought to regain control of their
air arms. To head this off, Trenchard sought a rationale for independence. He argued that an attacking
air force would be in a position to undermine an enemy’s will to fight by placing pressure directly on the
enemy population. Attacks on enemy “vital centers”
would cause the enemy population to call for better
air defenses, as the British had done in World War
I. The heavier and more persistent these offensive
attacks, the more the enemy would be driven on to the
defensive by popular cries for protection. The enemy’s
increasing defensive effort would place it on a slippery slope from which it would not be able to recover.
Many of Trenchard’s ideas were articulated in
the May 1928 memorandum on: “The War Object of
an Air Force.” He argued for attacking enemy materiel, undermining enemy will, and disrupting enemy
communications. He combined ideas about attacking
enemy military assets and communications (forms of
denial) with ideas about undermining enemy will. He
argued:
I would state definitely that in the view of the Air Staff the
object to be sought by air action will be to paralyse from the
very outset the enemy’s productive centres of munitions
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of war of every sort and to stop all communication and
transportation.25

He believed that the “moral effect” (psychological
effect) of air attacks to be “very great.”26 The idea of
“paralyzing” an enemy would be echoed, later on, by
air power theorists in the United States.
Trenchard saw great value in the ability of aircraft
to “pass over the enemy navies and armies, and penetrate the air defenses and attack direct the centres
of production, transportation and communication
from which the enemy war effort is maintained.”27 He
believed that each belligerent would “set out to attack
direct those objectives which he considers most vital
to the enemy. Each will penetrate the defenses of the
other to a certain degree.”28 Once this has taken place:
The stronger side, by developing the more powerful
offensive, will provoke in his weaker enemy increasingly
insistent calls for the protective employment of aircraft.
In this way he will throw the enemy on to the defensive
and it will be in this manner that air superiority will be
obtained, and not by direct destruction of air forces.29

Like Douhet, Trenchard felt there was no question
about whether bombers would appear in the next war:
Whatever we may wish or hope, [he argued] . . . , there
is not the slightest doubt that in the next war both sides
will send their aircraft out without scruple to bomb those
objectives which they consider the most suitable.30

The only answer was preparation and an offensive
spirit. Trenchard also argued that his air force could
make key contributions to the policing of parts of the
British Empire that were otherwise difficult to govern.
He advocated using air power coercively—threatening and using bombardment against those peoples
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who resisted British domination. Some modern writers have drawn interesting parallels between British
“air control” policies and contemporary use of RPAs
by the United States.
BILLY MITCHELL
William L. “Billy” Mitchell, son of a wealthy Wisconsin senator, enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army
during the Spanish American War and later gained
a commission. He served successfully in the Signal
Corps and began taking flying lessons at the age of
38. Mitchell went to France in 1917 and helped pave
the way for an American air contribution to the war.
A tireless and flamboyant leader, he rose quickly to
Brigadier General, commanding all American air
units in France. Despite his rapid rise, he alienated
many with his aggressive, arrogant style, which continued after the war. He feuded with the Army, and
his aerial attacks on stationary battleships in 1921 and
1923 placed him in the midst of a passionate fight with
the Navy. His harsh criticism of the crash of the Navy
dirigible Shenandoah, which, he argued, had resulted
from “an almost treasonable administration of the
national defense,” ultimately led to his court-martial
and ouster from the Army.31
Mitchell devoted the rest of his career to making
a public case for air power and an independent U.S.
Air Force. More an advocate and enthusiast than a
true theorist, Mitchell was tireless in his quest for
aerial resources, and for “air-mindedness” among the
American people. Mitchell’s style is apparent in his
1925 book, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military.
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His arguments are similar in style to those of Alfred
Thayer Mahan. He wrote:
The air-going people actually form a separate class. They
are more different from landsmen than are landsmen
from seamen. At the present time, the air-going people
in the national services are not accorded the position nor
the rank to which the importance of their duties entitles
them.32

He added, “The world stands on the threshold of the
‘aeronautical era.’ During this epoch the destinies of
all people will be controlled through the air.”33
Like Douhet, he downplayed ground-based air
defenses:
The only defense against aircraft [he argued] is by hitting
the enemy first, just as far away from home as possible.
The idea of defending the country against air attack by
machine guns or anti-aircraft cannon from the ground is
absolutely incapable of being carried out.34

He was prescient in foreseeing that air superiority
would have to be won through a battle between air
forces: “Great contests for air control will be the rule
in the future. Once supremacy of the air has been
established, airplanes can fly over a hostile country at
will.”35
He added:
How can a hostile air force be forced to fight, it may be
asked, if they do not desire to leave the ground? The
air strategist answers: ‘By finding a location of such
importance to the enemy that he must defend it against a
bombardment attack by airplanes’.36

Here again he was prescient, sensing that enemy fighters might in some instances have to be lured into the
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air. Like Douhet, he believed that aircraft would make
wars more intense, and thus shorter in duration:
The menace [of air power] will be so great that either a
state will hesitate to go to war, or, having engaged in war,
will make the contest much sharper, more decisive, and
more quickly finished. This will result in a diminished
loss of life and treasure and will thus be a distinct benefit
to civilization.37

With respect to the details of targeting, Mitchell’s
vision was—like Douhet’s and Trenchard’s—rather
all-encompassing: “Air forces will attack centers of
production of all kinds, means of transportation,
agricultural areas, ports and shipping; not so much
the people themselves.”38 However, he was inconsistent: at times, he prioritized denial and decapitation
(of communications); at other times, he appeared to
emphasize punishment.
Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell were revolutionary in their thinking: their work reflected an
unbounded enthusiasm for air power and an impatience with those who took a more evolutionary and
integrated approach to warfighting. Douhet and
Mitchell insisted on a battle for air superiority. All
three theorists expected that civilian populations
would hold up poorly in the face of bombing, and
expected that the threat of bombing might deter wars
or shorten them.
THE INTERWAR ERA
Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell were all influenced by the circumstances in which they found
themselves. Their central assumption about the inherently offensive nature of air power relied on a selective interpretation of the evidence from World War I.
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In general, they believed that airplanes would only
grow more capable in the future by flying faster and
higher, and it would thus be harder to defend against
them. They were also impressed by the vastness of
the sky; this physical fact, they believed, would give
a permanent advantage to the attacker. In the 1920s,
bombers developed more quickly than fighters did.
However, the momentum began to shift in the 1930s,
as fighter development began to catch up. Moreover,
the advent of radar changed the air defense equation
significantly.39
Air defense later took many forms and proved
much more robust than the early theorists had predicted. During World War II, for instance, the Germans in particular would develop highly effective
anti-aircraft (flak) guns that could reach and destroy
bombers flying at high altitude—and disrupt the flight
paths of many others. In terms of passive defenses,
the Germans would build decoy factories and towns.40
They also managed to disperse a great deal of their
industry and to place some of it underground.
Nearly all industrialized nations took an interest
in air power and long-range bombardment. However,
not all nations developed the latter. The way in which
air power was integrated into a state’s military organization was influenced greatly by geography and geopolitics. States with enemies on their borders including
Germany, Russia, and France could not afford to stray
too far from an army-centric military organization and
priorities. The English Channel was a moat protecting Britain; there was no desire among British elites to
maintain expensive and potentially disruptive large
standing armies. British interest in strategic bombing
was thus in line with British defense policy more generally. However, during the interwar years, the RAF
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did not back up theory with rigorous analysis of past
experience, or equally rigorous analysis of assumptions about the mechanisms linking air power to political outcomes.
The French, the leading aviation power in World
War I, never entirely recovered from the devastating
effects of that war. Economic and political problems,
as well as overall war-weariness, kept France from
regaining any semblance of the position it held up to
1917-1918. Russia, wracked by civil war and then devastated by the paranoid politics of Joseph Stalin, recovered only just in time to save itself with Allied help
from Hitler. The Russians would develop highly capable air power during World War II, but it remained
largely, albeit not entirely, tied to the Red Army.
Although the Treaty of Versailles had prevented Germany from having an interwar air force, the Germans
continued to take an interest in aviation and longrange bombing—and they retained active glider clubs.
The development of advanced, long-range bombers
lagged in Germany for a variety of reasons under
Hitler. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe (Hitler’s aerial warfare branch) developed highly effective methods of
coordinating tactical aviation and maneuver warfare
on the ground. Indeed, this cooperation was the heart
of what the West called “Blitzkrieg” early in World
War II. It facilitated the unprecedented speed with
which Hitler moved westward to the English Channel
in 1940, and made clear that no modern army would
be able to achieve maximum power in the future without sophisticated aviation.41
The American people, despite taking an interest
in the aggressive salesmanship of Billy Mitchell, did
not feel the need to create an independent air service
before World War II. The United States was largely
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defensive in its military posture, and most serving
officers who wrote about air warfare were obliged
to do so within careful boundaries. Nonetheless, the
organization that was first called the “U.S. Army Air
Service,” then the “Air Corps,” and later the “Army
Air Forces,” gained increasing autonomy during the
interwar years. Ideas about bombing an enemy war
economy were articulated in the documents and lectures of the Air Service, and later the Air Corps School
system.
In 1926, an unsung air theorist, William C. Sherman, put forward an early version of what became, in
the 1930s, the U.S. “industrial fabric” theory of bombing. Sherman wrote:
Industry consists . . . of a complex system of interlocking
factories, each of which makes only its allotted part of the
whole. . . . Accordingly, in the majority of industries it
is necessary to destroy certain elements of the industry
only, in order to cripple the whole. . . . On the declaration
of war, these key plants should be made the object of
a systematic bombardment . . . until they have been
sufficiently crippled.42

This approach was distinct from what either Trenchard or Douhet had argued. It did not rely on an
uprising from the population, or the enemy being (in
Trenchard’s words) “thrown on to the defensive.” It
assumed that a war economy would collapse if key
elements of it were destroyed by aerial bombing.
Sherman’s theory, developed further by his colleagues
in the 1930s, looked to the interdependence of modern
economies, and sought specific structural weaknesses
within them. By identifying and eliminating key nodes
in an enemy’s war economy, bombers might deny that
enemy the means with which to fight an industrial
war.43
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Despite possessing a theory of bombing and developing the tools that might be used to implement
it—the B-17 bomber and Sperry and Norden bombsights—the interwar Air Corps was officially prevented from thinking in terms of offensive action. Even
as Hitler made his aims increasingly clear in the 1930s,
the American people had no wish to be pulled into
another European war. However, by the late 1930s,
as President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to increase
military budgets, he gave special attention to the Air
Corps. He believed, initially, that air power might help
deter a war. Later, he envisioned the United States as
the “arsenal of democracy” but not a belligerent itself,
and he imagined that the United States might provide its future allies with advanced tools with which
to fight Hitler and Nazism. As the war approached,
American aviators received more autonomy, but not
full independence from the U.S. Army.
Perhaps it should be no surprise that both Britain
and the United States were drawn toward long-range
bombing in the 1930s. Both nations, blessed with geographical good fortune, had eschewed large standing
armies in favor of sea power. They followed a similar
pattern with respect to airplanes and air power. Their
inclination to substitute advanced technology for manpower was only reinforced by memories of the dreadful casualties of the long-stalemated ground battles of
World War I. Decision-makers in both states felt that if
a war had to be fought, it might be possible to fight a
quicker and perhaps even cleaner war through the air.
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WORLD WAR II: A TEST OF THEORY
When World War II began, the 1940 Battle of France
revealed that neither the French nor the British had
paid enough attention to air-ground cooperation on
the battlefield. Fortunately, the RAF had not neglected
air defense, even if Trenchard and his colleagues had
given rhetorical prominence to the offensive qualities
of long-range bombing. This fact enabled the British
to prevail in their quest to maintain control over their
own airspace during the 1940 Battle of Britain. Victory
in this vital battle meant that Britain remained in the
fight and could serve as a key staging area for a continuing war against Hitler.
As the war progressed, the Germans, like the British, constructed formidable defenses centered on
radar. However, if radar hindered the Germans in the
Battle of Britain, it would hinder British bombers in
their attempts to attack Germany. The British began
their bomber war with strikes on German oil and communication targets. This was not only to stay within a
general ethical framework but also because many in
the RAF thought such attacks would be the most effective and efficient. The British discovered early in the
war that they could not bomb in daylight without prohibitive losses; thus, they shifted increasingly to night
bombing. The RAF knew that such raids would suffer
from inaccuracy, but they did not fully appreciate the
degradation until the summer of 1941 when a thorough photoreconnaissance analysis revealed that only
about 1 in 5 bombers were getting within five miles
of their targets. In February 1942, the British formalized what had become obvious: since cities were the
only targets that Bomber Command could reliably
find and hit, British bombers would attack German
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cities, particularly those areas with dense populations
of industrial workers.44
This was an expedient strategy, undertaken at a
moment when aerial bombing was the only way that
Britain could strike back at Hitler. It was intended not
only to strike the enemy but also to bolster home front
morale. Sir Arthur Harris, who took over as head of
Bomber Command in 1942, believed in city bombing; he felt that the Germans valued their cities and
that cities were the main engines of modern war. He
believed that bombardment, combining elements of
punishment and denial (destruction of crucial industrial output), would sooner or later force the Germans
to sue for terms. He believed that in the battle between
the destruction Bomber Command could impose on
Germany, and the attrition Germany could impose on
Bomber Command, he and his force would win out.
The theory of victory here was distinct from others we
have seen. Interestingly, Harris was more committed
to city bombing than others in the RAF, and this dispute would later become a factor in the prosecution of
the war.45
In the autumn of 1942, when the Americans were
just getting their war effort organized, Winston Churchill invited them to join the nighttime bombing effort.
They declined. They were convinced that by flying
in groups of high-altitude, self-defending bombers,
they could defend themselves adequately and find
their way to specific industrial targets, undermining
the German war economy, and dealing a fatal blow to
the Luftwaffe.46 However, the Americans too suffered
high attrition, particularly when they began to attack
targets deep in German territory in 1943. The losses
eventually prompted the Americans to change course.
By bringing large numbers of long-range fighters
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equipped with droppable, self-sealing fuel tanks to the
theater, and flying raids on targets the Germans felt
compelled to defend, the Americans provoked aerial
battles of attrition with the Luftwaffe. This counterforce battle for air supremacy over Europe paralleled
Mitchell’s thinking. Eventually, this offensive—waged
by a vast and growing American force—overwhelmed
the Germans’ ability to train pilots, provoking a downward spiral from which they ultimately could not
recover.47
In Europe, the Americans initially tried to limit
themselves to industrial targets. However, the weather
was frequently too cloudy for bombsights to be used
effectively. Late in 1943, the Chief of the U.S. Army Air
Forces ordered that Americans would bomb through
overcast skies rather than not bomb at all when the
weather was poor. Like the British, the Americans
adopted this approach as an expedient measure. This
meant, however, that the Americans substantially
diverged from the “industrial web” theory a great deal
of the time. Their willingness to add incendiary bombs
to their ordnance mix also indicated a drift from their
original conception for long-range bombing. They
inaccurately bombed through clouds in bad weather
and used bombsights against specific industrial and
military targets when the weather was decent. During
poor weather in the winter of 1944-1945, 42 percent
of U.S. 8th Air Force bombs fell more than five miles
from their target.48
Similarly, cloud cover and jet stream winds prevented successful bombing of Japanese industry in
the Pacific theater, which the Americans attempted
to implement in 1944. By early 1945, the Americans—feeling an urgent need to make progress in the
war—abandoned this effort and turned to low-level
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incendiary attacks on Japanese cities. Over 60 such
attacks were waged, the most devastating on March
9-10, 1945, when well over 100,000 Japanese died in a
single attack on Tokyo, which was more than would
die at Hiroshima. As in Europe, the Americans tried
to do industrial targeting whenever conditions made
it feasible. The conventional bombing of Japan continued right up until the Japanese surrender in mid-August, with some raids taking place in between, and
even after, the two atomic attacks.49
What all air forces discovered in World War II was
that long-range bombardment is much more difficult
and demanding to prosecute than the interwar theorists had predicted. Air defense methods proved to be
formidable and effective; by no means did the bomber
“always get through” as so many had assumed it
would. Moreover, finding and hitting targets reliably—especially in bad weather—was anything but a
simple process. The enemy could thwart determined
efforts through deception, stockpiling of materials,
substitution, dispersion, and other means.
Throughout World War II, Allied tactical aviation
was an incredibly powerful asset. Indeed, its utility
simply cannot be overstated. After a bumpy start, talented aviators like Arthur Tedder and Arthur “Maori”
Coningham of Britain, and Pete Quesada of the United
States, raised tactical air power to a high art; they leveraged an Anglo-American asset in a way that gave
immense advantages to their national fighting forces,
protecting the overhead flank. This put heavy stress on
German infantry, reconnaissance, and armored units
that otherwise would have operated with far more
freedom of action. Air superiority facilitated Allied
reconnaissance and communication on the battlefields
of Europe, as well as battlefield strike and interdiction.
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On the Eastern Front, the Russians learned to cope
with German Blitzkrieg methods by developing their
own strong tactical aviation to support their fighting
forces on land.50
At sea, the development of aircraft carriers and
their complement of potent instruments including
strike aircraft transformed and revolutionized naval
warfare, and gave navies a new form of coercive leverage and new instruments for work at the tactical and
operational levels. The impact was seen most fully in
the unfolding of the U.S.-Japanese war in the Pacific,
and was made known to the world shortly after the
dramatic battle of Midway in 1942.51
Both the RAF and the U.S. Army Air Forces were
learning institutions, and they were able to continue
to prosecute their offensives even as they adapted to
the conditions they had failed to anticipate. By 1944,
the British were able to hit specific industrial targets
under the right conditions. In addition, the insistent American determination to defeat the Luftwaffe
proved immensely important and consequential. This
campaign gave the Anglo-Americans air superiority in Europe—and the attainment of air superiority
made the D-day landings feasible. D-day ensured that
the Anglo-Americans would have a say in the European settlement coming out of the war. Air superiority and continued bombing of enemy infrastructure
greatly aided the progress of Anglo-American armies.
In the last phases of the European war, aerial bombing of oil and railway targets had an immense impact
on the ability of the Wehrmacht (armed forces of Nazi
Germany) to prosecute a war of maneuver. German
factories needed coal, but a devastated railway meant
coal could not get to where it was needed. In addition,
Germany’s dwindling oil supply meant that its tanks
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and aircraft could not move and its pilots could not
train.52
During World War II, civilian populations proved
to be much less fragile and much more robust than
the interwar theorists had predicted. British civilians
during the Blitzkrieg and German civilians during the
long years of Anglo-American air attacks found ways
to adjust to life under fire.53 In addition, the effect of
local, immediate coercion (for instance, the Gestapo,
or secret police of Nazi Germany) could overwhelm
the effect of more remote coercive mechanisms like
enemy bombers. Finally, culture could play a role too.
In Japan, the strong commitment to the Emperor, who
held religious status in Japanese society, made it difficult for citizens to turn their anger or desperation
toward the overthrow of the existing government.
The shift to an emphasis on city bombing by
the British—and a partial shift to city bombing by
the Americans in Europe and a full shift in Japan in
1945—raised major, legitimate ethical questions that
are still debated today. Strategic bombing had been
embraced in hopes of finding a method of warfighting
that would avoid the horror of trench warfare. However, it brought its own kind of horrors. The air campaigns grew more intense as the war continued. The
large and devastating bombing of late 1945 in Europe,
for instance, took place in the wake of the V-weapon
(Vergeltungswaffen, or retaliatory weapons—V-1,
V-2, and V-3) attacks on Britain, the shock of the Battle
of the Bulge, and the fear of German jet fighters and
Schoerkel submarines (which some feared might
launch V-weapons against U.S. soil). Unfortunately,
the interwar theorists’ assumption that air war would
be too terrible to be endured for long did not prove
to be the case. The moral ramifications of long-range
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bombardment in both World War II theaters cannot be
sidestepped.
Because the strategic bombing of World War II did
not have the impact that the interwar theorists had
predicted, many postwar analysts concluded that it
had failed to live up to its promise and had contributed only marginally to victory. Nevertheless, these
critiques deserve scrutiny. In any analysis, the first
issue to consider is whether a different expenditure
of resources would have been likely or even possible.
Neither Britain nor the United States was comfortable with large standing armies; they both had bitter
memories of World War I and were anxious to avoid
that experience again. It is unlikely either would have
eschewed the promise of air power (alongside sea
power) in favor of a strategy that relied principally on
armies.
Even if bombing in Europe was imprecise and
highly imperfect, it still served to place an important
ceiling on the expansion of the German war economy—an effect that was crucial at key moments during
the war. Bomber Command’s 1943 campaign against
the Ruhr prevented German munitions czar Albert
Speer from carrying out a vast expansion of German
production that year—an expansion that would have
greatly benefited the Germans on the Eastern Front.54
Heavy American attacks on the Luftwaffe facilitated
the Normandy invasion. Prior to D-day, the bombardment by Allied bombers greatly disrupted the French
transport network and kept the Germans from waging
optimal maneuver warfare after the Allied Normandy
landing. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s deputy commander, recognized the crucial nature
of the Allied air attacks on the German rail net, and
he understood how they interacted with attacks on
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German synthetic oil in the last stages of the war. Air
power—both strategic and tactical—made immense
contributions to victory.
The debates that had begun in the interwar years
were not resolved during World War II, indeed, in
many respects, they intensified. One passionate air
advocate of this era was Alexander de Seversky. In his
1942 book, Victory Through Air Power, he wrote:
The most significant single fact about the war now in
progress is the emergence of aviation as the paramount
and decisive factor in warmaking. . . . All experts agree
that air power will play an ever more decisive part in
determining the power balance among the nations of the
earth.55

Long-standing debate has taken place on whether
or not the atomic attacks on Japan were necessary
for victory in that theater. Some have held that naval
blockade plus short-range bombing, along with the
threat of a Soviet ground offensive, would have been
enough to bring Japan to terms. Others have argued
that the shock of the atomic attacks pushed the Japanese to surrender. Of course, there is no simple
answer—and any attempt to address the issue must
consider both the timing of victory, the casualties
the Americans would have been willing to accept,
and the fear and heightened emotions of the period
of 1944-1945. Another relevant issue pertains to the
vague wording of the Potsdam Declaration, issued to
the Japanese as an ultimatum in July 1945. Historian
Richard Frank has made a compelling argument that
the effects of war, including sea blockade and conventional and atomic bombing, created fears in the minds
of civilian leaders of a popular uprising. If Frank was
right, then the fears that were created by the heavy
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punishment of the Japanese people at the end of a long
war, which had escalated steadily since Pearl Harbor,
had an impact on Hirohito and many of those in his
circle.56 Japanese surrender came, however, only after
immense pressure on the civilian population, and
ghastly losses.
In World War II, Britain’s Bomber Command and
the American bomber forces employed a mix of denial
through strategic interdiction of key elements of the
German war economy and punishment. Experience
proved that the denial efforts were more effective
than the punishment efforts. The latter did not have
prompt effects because civilians proved resilient and
able to resist, avoid, and counter the effects of even
very heavy bombing. In the end, strategic and tactical
aviation were able to work together—and with other
military instruments of power—to create formidable
synergies. These, combined with Russian success on
the Eastern Front, were more than the Germans could
handle. In the Far East, successful U.S. naval war and
interdiction, combined with the effects of bombing
from both long-range forces and bombers flying from
carriers, proved to be more than the Japanese could
endure.
THE COLD WAR AND THE KOREAN WAR
After World War II, bomber aircraft able to carry
nuclear weapons allowed the Americans to hold
enemy assets at risk from long distance. While the U.S.
Air Force would have won its autonomy after the war
anyway, the postwar emphasis on the nuclear mission guaranteed it and brought considerable resources
to the new Strategic Air Command (SAC). Under the
fiscally conservative Eisenhower administration, the
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SAC offered the United States an inexpensive way of
balancing against the large army maintained by the
postwar Soviet Union. From the 1950s to the 1980s,
the U.S. Air Force was a SAC-dominated institution;
its focus was geared toward maintaining a robust
deterrent force that would head off a nuclear conflict
between the superpowers. Indeed, SAC’s motto was
“Peace is our Profession.” When the Americans possessed only a small number of nuclear weapons, SAC
targeting focused on Soviet cities. Once the nuclear
arsenal grew, targeting shifted to Soviet industry—but
the bombs were large and devastating, and collateral
casualties among civilians would have been very high
as a result.57
The two Asian wars fought by the Americans
during the Cold War in Korea and Vietnam were frustrating for practitioners of long-range bombardment,
not least because the fear of escalation with Russia and
China kept constraints on targets American air forces
could strike. In Korea, training for atomic missions
went forward, but authorities withheld permission for
their use.58 The use of bombers did not translate into
steady progress toward victory, and as time passed,
American B-29 bombers became increasingly vulnerable to North Korean air defenses.59 The politics of
limited war ensured that enemy supply sources in
China and Russia remained off the target lists, and
North Korea itself contained only limited indigenous
industry; the industrial fabric theory was thus a poor
fit to the conditions of the war. SAC commander General Curtis LeMay would later say about the war, “We
never did hit a strategic target.”60 Moreover, like the
Japanese, the North Koreans proved able to endure
heavy punishment.
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After only a few months of war, U.S. bombers had
destroyed all of the industrial targets in North Korea.61
After the Chinese entered the war in late 1950, constraints on U.S. targeting were loosened and the U.S.
Air Force firebombed Pyongyang. However, the North
Koreans held out. The spring of 1951 brought very high
tension as General MacArthur pressed for a widening
of the war, and nine nuclear cores were released by
the Atomic Energy Commission and flown to Guam,
where they could be mated with bomb casings.62 In
1952, further attacks on Pyongyang, on smaller towns
and cities, and on North Korean hydroelectric plants
failed to break the war’s stalemate. The attacks on
power plants were made mainly by fighter bombers;
by late June 1952, this campaign had cut off 90 percent
of North Korea’s electrical power generation.63 Some
of these attacks were designed explicitly to “punish
the enemy with air power,” although the Americans
tried at the same time to retain the language of “military” targets, as they did not wish to cause a complete
break during the war from the norms prohibiting the
direct targeting of cities and civilians.64
The escalating bombardment campaign culminated in the spring of 1953 with the breaching of dikes
that led to the flooding of portions of the Korean rice
crop. The armistice that followed shortly thereafter (in
July 1953) was interpreted by some to mean that this
final form of aerial punishment had worked. However,
by that time, many other factors including the death of
Stalin were bearing in significant ways on the peace
process, and thus, it is difficult to tease out the precise events and effects that led to a settlement. After he
won the Presidency in November 1952, retired General Dwight Eisenhower—who had promised during
his campaign to end the Korean war—made indirect
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threats of nuclear war against North Korea. While historians disagree on the precise nature and impact of
these threats—what they entailed and how they were
conveyed—Robert Pape has argued that signals sent
to the Chinese, which had indicated the U.S. willingness to further escalate the level of violence in the war,
along with Eisenhower’s threats, influenced the thinking of the North Koreans and their allies.65
As historian Conrad Crane has argued, the Korean
war brought terrible devastation and death to the
peninsula. He points out that, “By the end of the war,
most North Koreans were living in hidden villages
or caves, and eighteen of their twenty-two major
cities had been more than 50 percent obliterated.” He
adds, importantly, “One of the primary motivations
for the contemporary North Korean nuclear and missile programs is to deter the United States from ever
doing that to their homeland again.”66 Robert Pape has
argued that the Korean war precipitated China’s independent nuclear program.67
As in World War II, skillful use of battlefield-oriented aviation was an irreplaceable asset to the Americans, saving the early war effort in 1950, and aiding
the conventional denial campaign that:
compelled the Communists to concede the future
presence of U.S. troops in South Korea as well as the
movement of the inter-Korean boundary from the Thirtyeighth Parallel to the military frontline somewhat north
of the parallel.68

Similar to World War II, American bombing in the
Korean war relied on combinations of denial, punishment, and risk strategies. As the war dragged on, and
as the Americans faced setbacks, initial constraints fell
away and targeting expanded. Strong tactical aviation
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provided invaluable help to United Nations forces on
the ground, without which they could not have survived and sustained themselves.
Once the Korean war ended, the U.S. Air Force
reverted to its priority focus: SAC preparation for possible war with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Air Force
was able to maintain that focus for just over a decade,
prior to the outbreak of the war in Vietnam, during
what were probably the most intense and dangerous
years of the Cold War, to include 1962—the year of the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
THE WAR IN VIETNAM
When President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisors increased the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam
in 1964-1965, they hoped that air power might facilitate a relatively quick and painless campaign that
would not drain resources from domestic programs,
including Johnson’s “Great Society” program. As had
been the case in the Korean war, Americans did not
want an escalation that would include either China or
the Soviet Union, so political constraints were again
placed on targeting and timing. The Johnson administration hoped that bombing carefully selected targets would demonstrate U.S. resolve; convince North
Vietnam that supporting the insurgency in the South
would be too costly; bolster morale in the South; erode
the morale of Viet Cong cadres; and generally intimidate the leadership of the insurgency, thereby convincing them that they could not win.69
In April 1964, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had
compiled a list of 94 bombing targets in North Vietnam. The Air Force wished to attack these immediately to impose psychological shock as well as physical
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damage. The Johnson administration, however, would
choose a more graduated approach. After Viet Cong
guerillas struck a U.S. military instillation in Pleiku
in February of 1965, American policymakers implemented Operation ROLLING THUNDER, an aerial
bombing campaign designed to keep North Vietnam
from moving men and supplies into the south, and to
persuade Hanoi to accept a peace settlement preserving an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam.
If the goals of ROLLING THUNDER were clear, the
strategy of coercion to be used was a matter of debate.
As Robert Pape had pointed out, the campaign ultimately included, at different times, elements of risk,
punishment, and denial strategies.70
In August 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara rejected the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation for attacks on North Vietnam’s strategic
oil facilities and electric power plants. The administration believed that by undertaking limited bombing
that would hold more valuable targets at risk, it could
signal the prospect of unacceptable escalation and
prompt the North Vietnamese to rethink their objectives. However, the administration entered into this
belief over-optimistically, and without a full understanding of Vietnamese motivation and determination
to liberate their nation from outside influences and
unite it. The Johnson administration also believed that
the North Vietnamese would be able to read clearly
the signals sent by this pattern of bombing.71
The Hanoi government began to disperse the
nation’s limited industry and erect passive and active
air defenses, and supplies and workers from the Soviet
Union and China aided these efforts. In light of this,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for an expanded bombing program late in 1965. Ultimately, the Johnson
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administration expanded the air campaign in 1966
and 1967: in June 1966, North Vietnam’s oil storage
facilities were bombed for the first time; in May 1967,
Hanoi’s main power station was attacked. North Vietnamese assets once held at risk were now targets.72
Unsurprisingly, the Air Force chafed at the early
restrictions that had been placed on the campaign.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff target list grew from 94 targets to 242 targets shortly after ROLLING THUNDER
began, and the latter number changed little through
the rest of the campaign. In 1965, 158 of these targets
were destroyed (nearly all of them were military targets below the 20th parallel); in 1966, 22 more were
destroyed. The President released nearly all of the
remaining targets for attack in 1967, and by December,
almost all of North Vietnam’s industrial war capacity
had been destroyed.73
During the war, the U.S. Air Force dropped some
6,162,000 tons of bombs—more tonnage than had been
dropped by the Allied Powers in all of World War II.
Many in the U.S. Air Force came to believe that the
constraints and gradual escalation had prevented
aerial bombing from achieving success. The fundamental problem, however, was that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were determined to achieve a
unified Vietnam free of outside influence—and were
willing to accept immense levels of pain to achieve
this.74 The Americans might have been able to better
understand this determination and foresee its consequences had they looked more closely at the French
experience in Vietnam.75
When the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were
fighting a guerrilla war, insurgents required few supplies, and could often move what they needed through
territory that was off limits to the bombers. They could
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fight the war at their own pace, backing off when their
losses became unendurable, and recommencing when
they had recovered. The slow pace—and the inability
of the Americans to build an effective government in
South Vietnam—eroded American public support for
the war. Structural factors, including the economy
and geography of Vietnam, helped insulate the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong against the effects of interdiction and coercive air power generally. Finally, even
if an earlier all-out air assault had convinced North
Vietnam to stop supporting the Viet Cong insurgency,
this is no guarantee that the Viet Cong would not have
continued the war on their own, and at their own
pace.76
In 1972, Operation LINEBACKER, an air campaign
designed to halt Hanoi’s spring ground offensive,
largely achieved its purpose and appeared to put a settlement in reach. By this time, the North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong were fighting conventionally and were
far more vulnerable to superior air power than they
had been previously in the guerilla war phase. Negotiations on a settlement went forward, but then North
Vietnamese negotiators stalled late in the day, prompting Operation LINEBACKER II, an 11-day campaign
from December 18 to 29, to bring enemy negotiators
back to the table to sign a final accord. LINEBACKER
II concentrated on military assets in and around Hanoi.
On December 29, communist leaders indicated a willingness to resume serious negotiations. Some observers argued later that a LINEBACKER-style campaign
executed at the outset of the war would have brought
victory. However, this perspective overlooked the crucial differences between 1965 and 1972. The success
of the LINEBACKER I campaign was facilitated by
the fact that Hanoi had shifted to a conventional war
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strategy. Moreover, by 1972 and certainly when LINEBACKER II commenced, the Hanoi leadership already
had achieved most of its political goals, and was prepared to sign an accord that would put its ultimate
aims within easy grasp.77
An important insight here is simply that all military
campaigns take place in a political context that will
impose political constraints. For a variety of reasons,
including the just war constraint of proportionality,
the Johnson administration was not prepared to wage
an all-out air assault in 1965. As the U.S. Air Force
fought in the Cold War campaigns in Asia, it reconfigured and reconstituted itself to meet the immediate
needs—and constraints—of those campaigns. However, on occasion, this led to episodes of profound
institutional discomfort. Another important insight is
that if one is going to rely on a coercive strategy meant
to change enemy behavior, then one must intimately
understand the enemy one faces. This requires sophisticated intelligence and astute analysis of such questions as: What is the enemy seeking? How much pain
is the enemy willing to endure to achieve its goal? Is it
structured to endure long-term pain? Can it manipulate the pace of the campaign and thus raise the price
of victory for its adversary?
THE IDEAS OF JOHN BOYD
One of the most influential thinkers to come to the
surface in these years was John Boyd, a fighter pilot
who flew F-86 Sabre jets in the famous “MiG Alley”
during the Korean war. Boyd was not, and did not
consider himself to be, an air power theorist per se.
His work was both more narrow and, on the other
hand, more expansive. Boyd captured the insights of
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his pilot experience in the intellectual work he called
the “energy-maneuverability theory,” which continues to guide the training of fighter pilots to this day.
He placed an emphasis on maneuver over speed, the
ability to make rapid changes in altitude, and good
visibility to foster situational awareness. All this was
pivotal in the design of a generation of American
fighters, including the F-15, F-16, and F-18, and Boyd
should be credited for his direct influence on these
aircraft.78
After retiring from the military, Boyd expanded his
work. He had an eclectic and wide-ranging intellectual
appetite, and was deeply influenced by a number of
trends that became dominant between the 1960s and
1990s, including cybernetics, systems theory, complexity theory, and chaos theory. He was also interested
in cognitive science and quantum mechanics, and was
influenced by the work of Kuhn, Popper, Heisenberg,
and the neo-Darwinists.79
Writing and speaking in the 1970s, when the
Cold War seemed to have ossified strategic thinking,
Boyd brought an emphasis to the work of Sun Tzu,
and facilitated the rediscovery of operational art—
in part through a focus on the concept of Blitzkrieg,
the sophisticated use of combined arms the Germans
employed at the outset of World War II. A member of
the “military reform” movement that gained energy
as a reaction to what seemed like a bureaucratic, attritional war in Vietnam, Boyd sought to resurrect the
idea of the adaptive, creative warrior.80 He eschewed
the concept of attrition and focused instead on imposing paralysis through maneuver. The guiding idea in
his work was that competitive human interaction—
warfare, specifically—is a struggle between complex,
adaptive systems. His work would influence the
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thinking and the vocabulary of all of the U.S. armed
services, but in the long run, would take particular
hold in the U.S. Air Force and the Marine Corps.81
A 1976 essay, “Destruction and Creation,” was his
opening step in the development of a longer intellectual exercise, documented in an unpublished series
of briefings called “A Discourse on Winning and
Losing.” In these, Boyd sought to capture the cognitive processes crucial to prevailing in a highly unpredictable and competitive world. This involved:
reaching across many perspectives: pulling each and
every one apart (analysis), all the while intuitively
looking for those parts of the disassembled perspectives
which naturally interconnect with one another to form
a higher order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of
what is taking place.82

The longest of the presentations (193 slides), called
“Patterns of Conflict,” has been described by one
scholar as the “intellectual heart” of Boyd’s work. It
brought together his ideas about winning and losing in
a competitive world filled with uncertainty and introduced the intellectual construct for which he is best
known: the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA)
loop.83
Anxious to move away from what he thought of
as reductionist and linear thinking, Boyd promoted a
theory of maneuver that was principally psychological; it aimed to “break the spirit and will of the enemy
command by creating surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations.”84 If conflict and uncertainty are unavoidable features of human society, then
one must rely on adaptability as the key to survival.
Drawing on both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Boyd
looked for ways that a combatant might reduce his
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own friction while simultaneously increasing the enemy’s. The OODA loop attempted to address human
behavior at the individual and organizational levels.
The adversary that was moving through the cycle
more rapidly and efficiently would prevail, by forcing
its enemy’s reactions to be increasingly ill-suited to the
prevailing situation. Often over-simplified by others,
the OODA loop was, in Boyd’s rendering, a complex
construct that required layers of sophisticated inputs
and ongoing feedback mechanisms.85
Boyd emphasized stretching beyond one’s own
self-oriented and self-limiting cognitive frames. By
increasing friction for the enemy, one can get inside
his OODA loop and stay there. Attrition warfare,
he believed, under-utilizes the mental and moral
domains. By contrast, maneuver, broadly conceived—
to include surprise, shock, deception, and ambiguity—
breaks an adversary’s cohesion and sows disorder and
panic. The goal is to “unstructure” the enemy’s system
into “confusion and disorder by causing him to underor over-react.”86
Boyd did not perceive potential enemies as either
static or fragile; indeed, he believed that an enemy
would constantly seek out its own ways to impose
shock and disorder. The key was to get ahead of the
enemy, in part through good training, trust, a strong
moral foundation, and intellectual creativity, and stay
there by applying continuous and escalating pressure.
Boyd dismissed single-answer solutions and ready
prescription. There was, he believed, no recipe or template for getting inside the adversary’s decision cycle.
It is specific to the circumstance, and must be arrived
at through insight, intuition, clarity of thought, and
the self-awareness that comes from wisdom and
experience.87
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Boyd did not provide targeting prescriptions.
However, many of his general ideas worked their way
into the thinking and doctrine of the U.S. Air Force and
other air forces and manifested themselves in the way
the U.S. Air Force fought in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and
in Afghanistan.88 Direct influences of Boyd’s work are
visible in the U.S. Air Force’s Basic Doctrine of 2003:
The ‘American way of war’ has long been described
as warfare based on either a strategy of annihilation
or of attrition and focused on engaging the enemy in
close combat to achieve a decisive battle. Air and space
power, if properly focused, offers our national leadership
alternatives to the annihilation and attrition options. . . . It
is possible to directly affect adversary sources of strength
and will to fight by creating shock and destroying enemy
cohesion without close combat. While such attacks may
not totally eliminate the need to directly engage the
adversary’s fielded military forces, it can shape those
engagements so they will be fought at the time and place
of our choosing under conditions more likely to lead
to decisive outcomes with minimized risk to friendly
forces.89

AFTER THE COLD WAR
The Persian Gulf war of 1991 saw the implementation of an air campaign that had multiple goals and
multiple theoretical underpinnings. However, part of
it bore the imprimatur of Colonel John A. Warden,
U.S. Air Force, who had been in charge of the Deputy
Directorate for Warfighting Concepts in the Air Staff
Directorate of Plans, and who had become particularly interested in the prospects of targeting enemy
leadership.
The air campaign in the Kuwaiti theater of operations had three primary objectives: suppression of
Iraqi air defenses; preparation of the battlefield for
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coalition ground attack; and support of the ground
attack.90 The strategic air campaign over Iraq was
designed to support the war aim by directly pressuring and degrading Saddam’s regime on a number of
levels. In 1988, Warden had circulated a paper articulating a targeting theory based on five principal categories, envisioned as five concentric rings (like rings
in a bull’s eye) that increase in value as they approach
the center. The focal point—his designated “center of
gravity”—was enemy leadership. Just outside of that,
in the position of second priority, were the enemy
state’s energy sources, advanced research facilities,
and key war-supporting industries. In the third ring
was enemy infrastructure, such as transportation systems. The fourth ring was comprised of the enemy’s
population, and the fifth ring designated the enemy’s
fielded military forces.91 Warden was focused mainly
on disrupting leadership and decapitating the state.
Warden’s book, The Air Campaign, begun when
he was a student at the National Defense University,
argued that air power allows for strikes against the full
spectrum of enemy capabilities, with leadership first
and foremost. The “five rings” model was an extension of the operational concepts he had first explored
in his book. In an essay he published in 1992 called
“Employing Air Power in the 21st Century,” he wrote:
The command structure . . . is the only element of the
enemy . . . that can make concessions. In fact, wars
through history have been fought to change (or change
the mind of) the command structure—to overthrow the
prince literally or figuratively or to induce the command
structure to make concessions.

He added:
When command communications suffer extreme damage
. . . the leadership has great difficulty in directing war
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efforts. In the case of an unpopular regime, the lack of
communications not only inhibits the bolstering of
national morale but also facilitates rebellion on the part of
dissident elements.92

The plan that Warden and his staff developed for
the Gulf war, “Instant Thunder,” won theater commander General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.’s endorsement, and Warden went to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to
brief Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, U.S. Air
Force. Uneasy with the plan’s failure to consider fully
the offensive capabilities of the Iraqi Army, Horner
modified it, changed its name, and appropriated several members of Warden’s staff to comprise a secret
“Central Air Forces Special Planning Group,” nicknamed the “Black Hole.”
Even though the aircraft coming into the theater
comprised the vast majority of the U.S. Air Force’s
precision delivery capability at the time, the force was
not ideally suited to the task Warden had set for it.
Technological evolution throughout the Vietnam war
had yielded some promising results in highly precise,
guided-bomb technology, but the Air Force had been
leisurely in its attempts to acquire it.93 Still, the U.S. Air
Force had the capacity to employ air-delivered, precision-guided munitions with hard target-penetrating
capability, and this would become a centerpiece of its
war effort. Robert Pape had observed that the capacity for high accuracy “encouraged strategic bombing
advocates to propose the first systematic decapitation
campaign in air history.”94 One can thus identify multiple theories of coercive air power at work in the Gulf
war. Along with a more traditional denial campaign,
Warden’s “Instant Thunder” plan hoped to isolate,
and possibly kill or overthrow Saddam Hussein. The

47

Saddam Hussein regime itself—the leader and the
structure under him—was the primary target.95
The Black Hole planners, led by Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, updated the air war plan right
through the opening hours of the war on January 17,
1991; they emphasized simultaneous attacks on target
sets that would have overlapping and linking effects.
Rather than attacking targets in a sequential, prioritized order, coalition air forces were able to carry out
simultaneous counter-air, interdiction, close air support, and strategic missions into Iraq. By mid-February, coalition bombers had struck the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense, the Baghdad Conference Center, the Military
Intelligence Headquarters, and television and press
buildings. As the month went on, strategic attacks targeted airfields, nuclear and chemical sites, communication facilities, and mobile Scud missile launchers.
Attacks on Iraqi communication targets surely
had a corrosive effect on the speed and efficiency
with which Saddam could conduct his war. However,
fiber-optic nets were more redundant and elusive than
the Black Hole had anticipated, and in some cases,
Saddam could resort to runners to carry messages.
The precise military and political impact of raids on
leadership and communication targets—the focus of
Warden’s theory—has been difficult to discern with
certainty, and are thus contested. As historian Richard
Davis concluded, “little solid data is available to connect the bombing of leadership or command and control facilities with specific consequences.”96
Strikes on Iraqi oil production sites led to the collapse of refinery capacity by the end of the war. However, the short duration of the war meant Iraq was
able to rely on stored supplies for military operations.
Pressure on the Iraqi population due to strikes on the
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electrical grid and other fuel sources may have contributed to the postwar uprisings by the Kurds and the
Shiites. However, it did not appear to lead to a weakening of the Sunni commitment to Saddam’s regime,
not least because of the deep fears the Sunnis held of
losing power to groups it had badly mistreated in the
past.97
The 5 months between the invasion of Kuwait and
the commencement of Operation DESERT STORM
gave Saddam time to further disperse and hide his
weapons of mass destruction capability—a set of
resources already dispersed in reaction to the Israeli
strike in 1981. The targets proved to be elusive, and
postwar inspections revealed that target planners—
who had operated with limited and outdated intelligence—had missed many facilities.
The coalition achieved its main aims, including the
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the right
of the United Nations to install peacekeepers on the
border, and the right to inspect and eliminate any
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Pape has argued
that the denial campaign “generated powerful coercive pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.”98
Through a variety of means, air power crippled Iraq’s
military strategy for holding Kuwait. Many analysts
have noted that the pressure on exposed ground
troops led to their demoralization; indeed, between 20
and 40 percent of Iraqi frontline troops had deserted
before the ground offensive commenced.99 However,
Pape was critical of the decapitation campaign, which
he believes did not attain its objectives. “Instant Thunder,” he wrote, “failed to kill, overthrow, or isolate
Saddam or his regime.”100 Saddam was hard to track
and find, and his communications were thicker and
more resilient than the Americans had anticipated.
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Moreover, the air campaign did not manage to set up
the conditions for a coup against Saddam’s regime.101
The speed and apparent ease of the Gulf war victory prompted many commentators to proclaim
that a “Revolution in Military Affairs” had occurred
based on the sophisticated technology employed by
American forces. Indeed, the one-sided outcome had
resulted from the interaction of American proficiency
and Iraqi incompetence. Poor skills and training
ensured that the coalition’s modern military toolkit
and operational proficiency punished the Iraqi Army
disproportionately.102
Warden continued to refine his ideas after the war.
He followed in the tradition of the early theorists in a
number of ways. Like Mitchell and Douhet, he placed
a strong emphasis on winning command of the air.
One of Warden’s protégés, Lieutenant Colonel (later
Lieutenant General) David Deptula, would become
particularly influential in the U.S. Air Force. He would
highlight the idea of parallel warfare reflecting a principle of electrical circuit design that “was based on
achieving specific effects, not absolute destruction of
target lists.”103 His approach focused on facilitating
simultaneous attacks on leadership targets; key essentials, such as oil and electricity; and communications
and fielded military forces. Using echoes of Boyd,
Deptula saw parallel warfare as part of the post-Gulf
war Revolution in Military Affairs that could offer
alternatives to the “attrition” and “annihilation” strategies of older styles of warfare. The specific effects
that Deptula highlighted were the new objects of war,
achievable through “effects-based operations.”104 He
argued that:
The strategies of annihilation and attrition rely on
sequential, individual target destruction as the ultimate
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method of success and measure of progress—generally
measured in terms of forces applied, or input. Using
effects-based operations, the determinant of success is
effective control of systems that the enemy relies upon
to exert influence—output [emphasis added].105

BY AIR POWER ALONE?
In 1999, NATO went to war in what ended up
being an air-only operation trying to halt Serbian mistreatment of the population in the then-province of
Kosovo. Ethnic Serbs formed a small part—about 10
percent—of the population of the province, which
consisted mainly of Albanian Muslims. The failure to
bring the opposed parties together at the Rambouillet
conference in early 1999 led to a NATO decision to try
to coerce the Serbs into accepting terms. The Clinton
administration expected Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic to cave in under air strikes in a few days,
but he did not. Muslims poured out of the province
and into refugee camps in neighboring states. Air
strikes, waged from high altitude to minimize the risk
to NATO pilots, could not halt events on the ground,
and the strikes seemed only to unify the defiant Serbs
behind Milosevic. NATO was cautious in all regards,
and there was considerable anxiety about whether
the alliance would hang together. Initially, President
Clinton would not agree to the use of ground troops.
In May, an increasingly alarmed NATO took advantage of improving weather to intensify the bombing—
attacking rail lines and bridges in Kosovo and Serbia
and, on May 24th, destroying the transformer yards of
the Yugoslav power grid. The latter had widespread
effects, including the undermining of the nation’s
banking system.106
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Significantly, NATO also began to discuss the use
of ground troops. This put the Russians—old allies of
the Serbs—in a particularly awkward situation since
they had no intention of ending up in a shooting
war with NATO at that time. Pressure from the Russians surely helped convince Milosevic that he had
to accept NATO terms. The bombing ceased in June,
and the United States and NATO sent a force of 60,000
troops (Kosovo Force) into Kosovo. Milosevic, who in
the meantime had been indicted as a war criminal by
the International Criminal Tribunal, was ousted from
power in the autumn of 2000.107
The air war over Kosovo rekindled the debate
about whether airplanes can win wars on their own.
Clearly, air strikes had not been able to halt the ethnic
cleansing; indeed, they hastened it. However, the relationship between the intensification of NATO strikes
in May and the acceptance of terms by Milosevic in
June suggested that the strikes on Serbia proper had an
important role in the outcome. The war was brought
to a conclusion before any ground forces were introduced, and thus, it was hard to take this victory away
from air forces. RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth
stated appropriately, “We may never know for sure
what mix of pressures and inducements ultimately led
Milosevic to admit defeat.”108
The very fact that NATO managed to sustain a
78-day campaign that—Milosevic believed—might
have continued indefinitely must have convinced the
Serb leader that his opponents were committed to
the cause. Another RAND analyst, Stephen Hosmer,
argued that Milosevic and others in his circle seemed to
fear that there might be no limit to the level of destruction NATO might be willing to impose; that indeed
NATO, led by the United States and Britain, might
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continue escalating to the point of “carpet bombing”
Serbia.109 As much political wrangling and tension
as there was in NATO, the members of the alliance
held together in a campaign that grew more intense
over time. Clear evidence that NATO was preparing
to authorize the use of ground troops was an unmistakable sign of this commitment. Not only did it spur
the Russians to pressure Milosevic, but also it signaled
to the Serb leader that his political and personal fortunes were more at risk from a continuation of the
war than from a cessation of it. A direct clash between
NATO and Serbian ground troops would have been
a nightmare for the Russians on multiple levels. The
way the campaign played out revealed that Milosevic
had miscalculated virtually every important strategic
issue of the war.110 In this instance, coercive air power,
backed by a threat of ground war, achieved NATO’s
aim. Nevertheless, the campaign had been difficult to
wage, not least because of the conflicting imperatives
and constraints of alliance partners.
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
Although the decade of the 1990s was tumultuous,
the first decade of the new millennium would prove
to be even more so. The U.S. Air Force had important
roles to play in the wars fought in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, and in the stabilization efforts that continued
in their aftermath.
U.S. Air Force Basic Doctrine (November 2003)
echoed elements of Warden and Deptula:
Air and space forces, through their inherent speed, range,
and flexibility, can respond to national requirements
by delivering precise military power to create effects
where and when needed. . . . Strategic attack is defined
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as offensive action conducted by command authorities
aimed at generating effects that most directly achieve
our national security objectives by affecting the
adversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and
strategy. . . . As a concept, strategic attack builds on the
idea that it is possible to directly affect an adversary’s
sources of strength and will to fight without first having
to engage and defeat their military forces.111

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while resting
heavily on the efforts of the U.S. Army and Marines,
nonetheless saw air power applied in a range of ways.
In the first phases of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United States teamed its special operations
forces, who were equipped with advanced data links
and sensors, with friendly indigenous fighters to evict
the Taliban regime. As Frans P. B. Osinga observed,
“A network of sensors and communications systems
glued together combat aircraft, dispersed air bases,
command centers, and special forces.”112 During the
brief major combat phase of the Iraq war in 2003, air
power was able to continue to press the offensive
when weather conditions halted the ground troops,
paving the way for swift entry into Baghdad.
Air assets continued to provide crucial support to
ground troops even as the conduct of the two wars
changed over time. Sometimes, doctrinal differences
between services and lack of joint exercises slowed
and complicated the wartime integration of ground
and air, but all parties revealed a commitment to
adaptation and real-time learning.113 In a recent analysis and critique of air power theory, Colonel Jeffrey
Smith, Commandant of the U.S. Air Force’s School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies, argued that with
the emergence of the counterinsurgency campaigns,
the U.S. Air Force had to re-engage with theory and
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operations that had been, since Vietnam, underappreciated and secondary:
Daily operations now required tactical airlift, special
operations, ISR, close air support, and tightly integrated
action with ground forces.114

He argued that in the new situation, the demand for
ISR became “insatiable,” and the need for RPA pilots—
“once a dreaded and often considered career-ending
path—became phenomenally important.”115
In counterinsurgency operations, the use of air
strikes independent of ground operations can be tricky
and, at times, counterproductive. A misguided bomb
that kills civilians can quickly alienate the population,
undermining the strategic purpose of the campaign.
Insurgent forces that control the pace of the war can
use cover and concealment to avoid air strikes much
of the time. In addition, they will intermingle with
civilians in urban areas or use human shields to protect themselves from the superior air power wielded
by their opponents. All of these factors put very real
constraints on the use of air power. However, they do
not rule out the use of air power in counterinsurgency
campaigns. If used carefully and sparingly, independent air strikes can be invaluable in attacking highly
specific targets. Moreover, with the precision capabilities now available—particularly through remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs), which are often referred to as
RPAs—such strikes can target particular individuals
who may be instrumental in the planning and implementation of terrorist activity. However, caution, care,
and intentionality are required. As Major Jason Brown
wrote in 2007:
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when operational-level commanders can ‘watch’
insurgents in real time by means of ISR feeds, they tend to
fall back to the tactical level, thus reinforcing the ‘we must
do something now’ mentality. This reactive approach can
quickly devolve into a game of ‘whack a mole,’ which
can cause commanders to neglect other important lines
of operation and lose focus on the strategic end state.116

To avoid this, he insisted, “commanders and planners
must integrate the use of airpower for dynamic targeting into the operational design of a counterinsurgency
campaign.”117
Inter- and intra-theater transport of personnel and
equipment is always a critical mission for air power
in counterinsurgency. In addition, the first decade of
the 21st century surely called attention to the expanding need for ISR resources and platforms. Finally, air
forces can offer invaluable assistance to newly developing indigenous air forces opposing insurgents. Well
into the foreseeable future, the U.S. Air Force is likely
to continue its role in advising, training, and equipping partner air forces.118
LIBYA
The decision by NATO in early 2011 to support
the rebel forces opposing Libyan dictator Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi highlighted the political appeal
of reaching for the air power instrument to solve
political problems. However, it has also raised to the
surface many of the issues and complications associated with the strictly independent use of air power
in conflict. Even though Gaddafi was wielding state
power, his forces adopted many of the tactics associated with insurgents. He manipulated the pace of the
war to erode the will of his enemies; used cover and
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concealment to take his forces out of reach of superior
air power; and resorted to commingling in cities and
using human shields to deter NATO air strikes. As
defense analyst Stephen Biddle wrote in a Washington
Post editorial:
Locals with existential stakes often prove more stubborn
than distant Americans expect, and even high-tech
firepower has serious limitations against low-tech but
determined enemies who control the people on the
ground through close-up violence.119

He added:
Especially when the multilateral action is based on
protecting civilians, rather than defeating one side, a
dictator willing to mix ruthless fighters with innocent
noncombatants poses serious challenges to limited
applications of precision air power. The result could
easily be a drawn-out, grinding stalemate.120

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT: ISSUES
AND QUESTIONS
From the end of the George W. Bush administration, and continuing through the Obama administration, U.S. policymakers expanded the use of RPAs for
the targeted killing of those considered threats to U.S.
security. This tool was used initially in very limited circumstances to target high-ranking al-Qaeda officials.
However, over time it became a means, as Professor
Rosa Brooks explained, “to go after an ever-lengthening list of bad actors, many of whom appear to have
only tenuous links to al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks,
and many of whom arguably pose no imminent threat
to the United States.”121 This warning came in Brooks’
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testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 2013.
The benefits and costs of using RPAs for targeted
killing is a topic policymakers and planners must consider carefully. RPAs have an inherent appeal: they
seem to allow a leader the opportunity to strike in
ways that are relatively precise in comparison to other
military tools, and that pose no immediate risk to military personnel. The work is carried out quietly and off
the front pages of newspapers. This means that it has
little immediate political cost. Thus, the strikes can
have the appeal of a silver bullet—a low-cost, almost
magical way to dispatch enemies. However, dangers
lurk in this seductive appeal. One first-order question is simply about due process of law. The target of
an RPA strike has no opportunity to face the charges
against them or argue a case before a court. Who
ought to have the authority to be judge, jury, and executioner (all three) in these cases? Using RPAs for the
targeted killing of enemies concentrates vast power
in a few hands—and this sets up a situation that can
be quite readily abused if it is not overseen and monitored for compliance with domestic and international
law. There is also a concern about mission creep. How
high on the enemy leadership chain need one be to
qualify for an RPA strike? What evidence must that
person reveal of intent to do harm? How imminent
and clear must that threat be?
Many critics of RPAs during the Obama years saw
their use as evidence of American high-handedness
and arrogance—evidence that Americans do not feel
themselves to be bound by any rules or constraints
in their international behavior. They perceived an
American President using RPAs rather like a self-proclaimed Zeus, hurling thunderbolts from the sky.

58

However, there is also another concern. Most analysts
agree that terrorist threats die a natural death over
time. The harsh methods of the terrorist are so alienating that those who wield them are ultimately rejected
by local populations. The danger with RPA strikes is
that because they arouse deep resentment, especially
when unintended civilian casualties occur, they may
prolong the life of terrorist movements that otherwise
would die out on their own.
Brooks argued:
Drone [RPA] strikes enable a ‘short-term fix’ approach
to counterterrorism, one that relies excessively on
eliminating specific individuals deemed to be a threat,
without much discussion of whether this strategy is likely
to produce long-term security gains.122

She added:
At the moment, there is little evidence that U.S. drone
[RPA] policy—or individual drone [RPA] strikes—result
from a comprehensive assessment of strategic costs and
benefits, as opposed to a shortsighted determination to
strike targets of opportunity, regardless of long-term
impact.123

This critique could apply to any air-based platform
used in a similar way. Undertaking the kind of comprehensive assessment that Brooks calls for is the role
of the strategist.
THE ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY
Leaders of contemporary air forces are aware of the
range of missions they may be called upon to fulfill in
the future. They know they must ensure that their personnel possesses not only a wide-ranging skill set but
also detailed operational knowledge. In addition to
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working with service partners and international partners to leverage strengths and create synergies, the
U.S. Air Force will continue to develop capabilities in
realms where it leads the world, including aerospace
and intelligence technologies. Intelligence, which is
central to effective targeting, always will be a core element of air power; intelligence partnered with precision capability enables an air force to take on specific,
high-priority missions, some of which may develop
on short notice, and in crisis situations.124
David Deptula has explained that new technology is changing the way aircraft operate in combat.
Modern platforms—RPAs and advanced ISR and
strike aircraft—can now perform multiple roles,
enabling “compression of the ‘find-fix-finish’ equation
in both time and space.” This, he adds, “greatly compresses the time required for successful closing of the
‘observe, orient, decide, and act’ loop.”125 Similarly,
U.S. Air Force Basic Doctrine (2015) states:
The proper application of a coordinated force across
multiple domains can produce effects that exceed the
contributions of forces employed individually. . . . the
objective is the precise, coordinated application of the
various elements of airpower and surface power to bring
disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply
with our national will . . . or to cause functional defeat of
the enemy forces.126

The doctrinal statement here also reveals that the U.S.
Air Force has become, over time, more comfortable
in the joint arena. Now secure in its independence, it
does not feel so compelled to constantly reiterate the
primacy of independent action.
Leaders of contemporary air forces know that they
must do the difficult intellectual work necessary to continually update and refine the theories that underpin
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their doctrine and actions. Air power can hit value
targets and force targets; some targets, like leadership, are both value and force targets. Precision capability has enhanced the ability of air forces to hit both
types, yet precision capability does not preclude occasional errors, which can be quite costly to the strategic aims of a campaign. Nor is precision capability a
silver bullet, allowing a magical route to the solution
of a complex political problem. In order to blunt the
effects of precision, many adversaries will be prepared
to intermingle their forces with civilians, exploit social
media methods, and remain highly dispersed.
Recent experience has indicated that strong norms
remain in place around the idea of discrimination;
air forces that disregard it do so at the risk of losing
domestic and international support. Trends in the
modern world mean that infrastructure, rather than
being state-owned, may be an international asset.
Thus, hitting an industrial site or power generation
facility may impact our allies nearly as much as it
impacts our adversaries.127
The idea of creating paralysis by cutting off or
shutting down an adversary’s communications is
challenged by global cell networks, hardened communication lines, and space-based communication. In
addition, aircraft speed may not be the asset it once
was. As Colonel Smith put it, “Given new detection
capabilities, advanced radar and targeting systems,
and global communications systems that work in
nanoseconds, traditional aircraft speed may provide
little in terms of advantage.”128
Coercive air campaigns must be designed very
carefully. If they underestimate or misread the enemy,
they will fail. One must know the enemy one is dealing
with and the kind of war one is fighting. Campaigns
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that depend upon gradual escalation and signaling are
particularly tricky since they rest on a very sophisticated understanding of enemy motives, strengths,
weaknesses, aspirations, and fears. The signals sent
must be understood clearly by the recipient, and the
recipient must be willing and able to comply with
them. In these campaigns in particular, there is a high
risk of miscommunication. In many situations, a lowtech but determined enemy can be a formidable foe.
No planner can assume that they will be given
freedom to launch the kind of all-out offensive that
usually seems instinctive to those in the military. Constraints on the use of force (in some form) are very
likely to infringe on the air planner’s dream of an allout, paralyzing offensive right from the start. Proportionality remains an important norm for jus in bello.
Punishment campaigns do not have a strong track
record; human beings tend to be both adaptable and
resilient. Beyond that, enemy political leaders can
often find ways to push pain on to the population, and
then manage the reaction through more direct, coercive mechanisms, like secret police. Moreover, punishment campaigns that appear indiscriminate often will
be viewed harshly by a domestic audience, allies, and
the global community. Popular uprisings and coups
are more difficult to instigate than air theorists have
tended to assume. Even if a state or political actor is
decapitated, it does not guarantee improvement in the
political situation; indeed, the situation may become
worse, or at least harder to control.
Elements of the “industrial fabric” theory continue
to influence air power operations. Various theorists
operating under this broad umbrella have sought to
find key node targets that would quickly degrade or
eliminate an enemy’s ability to fight effectively. This
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theory is immensely appealing, not least because it
promises efficiency, but its inherent seductive qualities must be understood. As the Anglo-Americans
found out in World War II, an enemy can find ways
around bottlenecks, especially if resources can be
obtained from occupied territories, allies, or those
willing to break sanctions. The modern effects-based
operations tradition has links back to the “industrial
fabric” idea. Warden’s special emphasis on leadership and communication is another attempt to find a
key card in a house of cards—a way of producing a
big impact from a highly specific target set. Warden
and Boyd both hoped to evoke in an enemy a kind
of system “paralysis” that is not without parallel to
Douhet and Trenchard’s violent, all-out air offensive.
The details, though, are different. Precision capability
would allow for the takedown of very specific enemy
assets. Whether this act would actually create “paralysis” depends on many factors, all of which must be
accounted for in high-quality staff work. Contemporary air theorists often seek a strategy that “focuses on
ending wars rather than fighting them.” John Andreas
Olson elaborates: “A leadership-oriented systemic
approach identifies and targets centers of gravity,
critical vulnerabilities, and key linkages rather than
focusing on engaging through a denial strategy fixated
on military forces.” He adds, “Disrupting an opponent’s decision-making calculus renders the opponent
increasingly deaf, dumb, and blind to proactive and
constructive actions.”129
Many air theorists are of the belief that non-lethal
mechanisms will become increasingly important tools
in the arsenal of air warfare. However, even in this scenario, one cannot assume that the enemy will respond
as the theorist or planner expects. Adversaries—as
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John Boyd pointed out—are adaptive; they will seek
and find ways to resist coercion of all kinds. Finally,
air power on its own does not allow one to control the
politics or the narrative on the ground in the aftermath
of paralysis. One can rely on indigenous allies for this,
but their goals and incentives are rarely the same as
one’s own—as the United States discovered, to its discomfort, in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Those who work in the contemporary aerospace
realm realize that we are moving quickly toward
a complicated moment in time. Charting a course
through the current information revolution means
accepting the fact that the ideas, mechanisms, methods, and platforms we have relied on for 100 years
are going to be in flux and transition for the foreseeable future. The way we use air power—and indeed
the air power we can use—will vary with the situation we face. In some scenarios, traditional ideas and
legacy platforms will continue to have full value; in
other scenarios, they will have partial value; and in
still other scenarios, they will have almost no value
at all. Today, “the increase in detection capabilities,
especially ground-to-air weapons systems, is advancing exponentially in terms of both competency and
low-cost production.”130 It will be increasingly difficult
for objects—particularly those in the air—to operate
undetected. Furthermore, detection means they can be
targeted by increasingly precise and reliable defensive
systems. As one author has explained:
Given this inversely proportional relationship between
detection technology and antidetection technology, any
strategy that relies on current and traditional physical
access using significant systems (traditional aircraft) in
the future will likely be disappointing.131
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This fact will have important implications on all air
forces in the future; the required shift in thinking may
seem particularly drastic for the U.S. Air Force, which
has been able to work in permissive air environments
for the previous 2 decades, and has been able to win
air superiority consistently since World War II. Some
analysts believe that we may have to rethink traditional notions of air superiority: “no country will be
capable of gaining and maintaining air superiority
due to future advance detection and targeting technologies.” Others disagree. Brigadier General Alex Grynkewich, assigned to examine ways the U.S. Air Force
might be able to maintain the capacity for gaining and
maintaining air superiority, bluntly stated: “Air superiority is not an optional capability. Without it, you
lose.”132
Thus, we will see another offense-defense struggle and, like previous iterations, it will see spirals of
measures and countermeasures. Grynkewich and his
team recognized that simply upgrading existing systems would not suffice. They discovered as well that
the issue was not just one of penetrating and persisting in enemy airspace to create effects; it was, rather,
one of serving “as a key node in what was emerging
as a new, conceptual multi-domain battle network.”133
Going forward, the U.S. Air Force is counting on the
stealth capabilities of future aircraft, including the
B-21; small, hard-to-track RPAs capable of ISR and
attack; and advanced cyber- and space-based technologies. It will seek to go above and below defensive
technologies, relying on space, cyberspace, and low
altitude. Enemy anti-satellite and cyberspace capabilities may be threatened “left of launch.” New systems
will be required to operate over long distances, and
will often be dispersed; they will need robust logistical
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support. In addition, they will need to have the capacity to recover and regenerate combat power following
enemy attack.134
In the future, A2/AD assets will be owned increasingly by modern powers, and this will change the
operating environment for aircraft in important ways.
While recognizing that prediction is imperfect, Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich argue that A2/AD
assets, which are likely to be owned by the United
States and China by 2040, will erode U.S. command of
the global commons, and will create a situation characterized not by Chinese hegemony over the Western
Pacific but by:
a more differentiated pattern of control, with a U.S. sphere
of influence around allied landmasses, a Chinese sphere
of influence over the Chinese mainland, and contested
battlespace covering much of the South and East China
Seas, wherein neither power enjoys wartime freedom of
surface or air movement.135

They point out as well that the ever-increasing range
and reduced cost of precision-guided missiles is
giving many states a coercive strategic bombardment
tool capable of striking a wide array of fixed targets,
including power plants, industries, and cities.136
The changing environment will pose serious challenges to air forces worldwide, forcing them to invest
in sustained analysis, research, doctrinal development,
and the adroit acquisition of, and adaptation to, new
technologies. All of this will be complicated by the
need to interweave these assets and capabilities with
those operating in the cyberspace and space realms.
Indeed, the speed and magnitude of change in this
environment is likely to place on analysts and planners the kinds of demands not seen since the rapidly
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transforming warfighting environment experienced
during World War I.
AEROSPACE POWER
Colin Gray has written:
The conflation of air and space into aerospace has
the authority of three and a half decades and points,
accurately enough, to the leading role of the air force in
developing, acquiring, launching, and maintaining space
systems.137

As early as 1959, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas
D. White explained, “air and space comprise a single
continuous operational field in which the Air Force
must continue to function.”138 Of course, only spacecraft can operate in the vacuum of space, so one
must be careful with White’s assertion of a “continuous operational field,” which was an early claim to
a domain. Gray argued that space systems are force
multipliers for ground-based systems, and this is
undoubtedly true: today, armies, navies, and air forces
depend heavily on assets located in space, including
space-based weather systems and global positioning
systems (GPS).139 This interdependence and synergy
between earth and space—the latter including both
low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit—will only
develop further over time. It is therefore in the interest of the services to protect those assets, particularly
in times of conflict. However, even though nations
have been operating in space for decades, there is
much that remains to be worked out regarding legal
definitions, acceptable activities, and rites of passage.
Trying to draw close parallels to either airspace law or
law of the sea is problematic since neither is an ideal
fit—although some precedents are useful.
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After the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, concern
that space would be weaponized led to a declaration
that it ought to be reserved for peaceful purposes.
However, the inherent advantages of this approach,
sometimes referred to as the “sanctuary school,” have
been buffeted by the pressure of technology. In light of
this, new models have been proposed; one that seems
to be gaining ground, at least in U.S. debates, is the
“control school.” Control school advocates argue:
there are space lanes of communications that must
be controlled if a war is to be won in the terrestrial
theaters.” They argue further “the capability to deter war
is enhanced by the ability to control space and that, in
future wars, space control will be co-equal with air and
sea control.140

Philip Swarts has written:
Any conflict between the U.S. and an adversary is highly
likely to include a space component in the future. Whether
it’s trying to knock out communications, disrupt GPS,
or destroy missile warning systems, the U.S. and other
nations will try to find ways to eliminate each other’s
satellites and space assets.141

Biddle and Oelrich have argued that in a high-stakes
confrontation with China, the United States cannot
assume that its satellites will survive. Rather than
trying to reconstitute space assets in wartime, the U.S.
Air Force should keep in mind that:
surveillance, target acquisition, and guidance can all
be provided by airborne platforms that can be made
independent of fixed bases; communications can be
provided by airborne relays and links, and navigation
can be accomplished via natural celestial or terrestrial
reference points.142
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Contemporary discussions of the future environment make it clear that space, an immensely valuable
domain, is almost certain to be contested, just as air
was 100 years ago. It is therefore essential for contemporary students of strategy to gain a fundamental
grasp of these discussions and debates, and to understand the ways in which they are likely to affect future
wars, and to evolve over time.143
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